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Loss for Words-Subversive Starvation 
Fanny Saderbiick 
En prenant le corps anorexique comme exemple, j'examine dans ce qui 
suit la possibilite' d'un autre langage La femme anorexique, en 
utilisant son corps comme une bouche, essaie d'exprimer ce qui ne peut 
pas 12tre par le langage @hallogocentrique) dont nous disposons. Elle 
rend visible la position marginalise'e qui lui est assigne'e comme femme, 
comme Autre absolu, comme ce qui ccne peut pas Btre dit)), et proteste 
contre cette position. Elle y parvient hyperlitte'ralement en poussant la 
catigorisation des genres jusqu'a ses limites extrimes, awcjbntiires de la 
mort. Par les notions driitation, empnmte'e h Luce Irigaray, et de 
parodielperfomativiti, formule'e par Judith Butlel; je sugg2re que la 
femme anorexique, en exagirant les idt?amjZminins, les montre comme 
une construction culturelle faisant souflir les femmes. 
My friend neither eats nor drinks. She floats through life, 
weightless, wordless. Out of emptiness, she creates a selJ: She 
exceed boundaries, refuses to be dejned. She mimics and 
mocks, is a lightweight magician. 
In the pursuit of femininity, she goes beyond it, my fading 
friend She raises her voice and shouts at the world Without a 
single word breaking the surface. 
She smashes test tubes, my beautifulfiiend Fills boxes with 
shard of knowledge. Breaks theories and creates a new world 
Where hysterics laugh and Oedipus sees again. 
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Introduction: Anorexia and Language 
"A woman can but be excluded by the nature of things, which 
is the nature of words, and it must be said that if there is some- 
thing that women themselves complain about enough for the 
time being, that's it. It's just that they don't know what they're 
saying-that's the whole difference between them and me." 
Jacques Lacan 
"Throughout history people have knocked their heads against 
the riddle of the nature of femininity. [. . .] Nor will you have 
escaped worrying over this problem-those of you who are 
men; to those of you who are women this will not apply-you 
are yourselves the problem." 
Sigmund Freud 
If we are to believe the two most important psychoanalytic figures of our times, 
Jacques Lacan and Sigmund Freud, woman is a problem, a riddle. She must be 
examined and scrutinized, but this can only be done according to "masculine" 
parameters, according to a phallocratic order, since she herself does not know 
what she is saying, since she is the problem, since she is already defined as 
excluded (from discourse), as "not-whole," as "lack," as "negativity." When 
Lacan, in his seminar on Feminine Sexuality, said that ''wtxwm cannot be said," 
his choice of vocabulary, the French se dire, ultimately points to the fact that it is 
women themselves who are unable to "say themselves," to pronounce their own 
existence, to verbalize their being (Lacan 1998, 8 1). Women not only lack (and 
envy) the male organ, the penis. They (precisely because they do not have a 
penis?) also lack language. They are mute, silent, or limited to idle chatter. 
Many feminist psychoanalysts and philosophers (like Braidotti, Butler, 
Cixous, de Lauretis, Irigaray, Kristeva and others) have, of course, criticized this 
"truth" about women, and seen as their task to find ways out of the phallocratic 
order, to reclaim their subjectivity and agency beyond the masculine parameters. 
A different logic. A female voice. A language of their own. 
This paper is an attempt to formulate an alternative, or rather a critical 
response, to the excluded position that has been ascribed to women in our culture 
and within psychoanalytic theory. With the anorexic woman as example, I want to 
examine the possibility of a dgerent kind of language. Using her body as mouth- 
piece, the anorexic woman, one might say, is trying to articulate something that 
cannot be expressed in the (phallocentric) language available to us, something that 
escapes or transcends the "signification of the Phallus" (Lacan 2004, 271 ff.). 
From her own perspective, she tries to make visible and protest against the mar- 
ginalized position ascribed to her as woman, as absolute Other, as that which 
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"cannot be said." And even though her protest might be seen as a failure, since she 
herself risks dying (and oftentimes does die--up to eighteen percent of anorexics 
die from their illness), it is nevertheless, I think, a protest worth our attention.' 
Language Lost 
More than ninety percent of all anorexics are women. One in five women is 
likely to suffer from an eating disorder, anorexia or bulimia, during her lifetime 
(Farrell xiii). Women who starve themselves have occurred throughout history. 
Rudolph Bell, in Holy Anorexia, makes a convincing case that Catherine of 
Sienna (1347-SO), along with many of her contemporaries, was anorexic (if not 
anorexic bulimic). There is no doubt that these medieval women, who fasted, 
vomited and were overactive, gained political powers and prestige by their 
actions. 
Freud linked bulimic symptoms of food cravings and vomiting to hysteria, 
which was then long seen as the aetiology of anorexia (Farrell 22). And even 
though many anorexics do not have a hysterical character structure, feminists 
have drawn parallels between the two, since they are both typically female ill- 
nesses (there are male anorexics, just as there were male hysterics, but the large 
majority are and were female), and since the two have been understood not only 
in clinical (physical/psychological) terms, but also, and maybe more so than any 
other illness, as "symptoms" of a sexist culture.ll 
The early Freud assumed that hysteria was caused by unconscious trauma 
that manifested itself in physical symptoms, since the hysteric woman herself 
could not express the unconscious in words. Hysteria was thus assumed to exist 
in a sphere where "ordinary" (masculine?) language was insufficient, and the 
body became a spokesperson for something that could not be kept back in the 
unconscious. Anorexics, too, use their bodies rather than words to express their 
suffering. Em Farrell, psychoanalyst who has worked with more than 170 women 
with eating disorders, writes that "words are as, if not more, problematic for 
women with eating disorders than their relationship to food" (Farrell xiv). Words 
are either seen as a useless form of communication, or as being overwhelmingly 
powerful, so powerful that one may drown in them, or be torn to pieces by them. 
Words are "dangerous" and "unwanted." Or, as one of Farrell's patients explains: 
"Words are useless, I want to make you feel what I feel, words are no good" 
(Farrell xiv). 
This woman, Farrell suggests, expresses frustration with the dverence 
implicit in language: "Difference has implicitly to be acknowledged when words 
are used to attempt communication" (Farrell xiv). For her, the only satisfactory 
way of communicating is two people feeling intensely and identically ("I want to 
make you feel what I feel"), a state of fusion, of non-differentiation. A return to 
the pre-verbal relationship with the mother, the original symbiosis (mother as 
food)? An attempt to escape adulthood and, more importantly, womanhood? This 
seems to be Farrell's argument, and many psychoanalysts understand anorexia 
exactly as such an attempt to avoid separation."' I will, instead, make the claim 
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that the anorexic, in her fear for words, rather than trying to return to a pre- 
verbal, undifferentiated state, is attempting to reformulate our language, which is 
based on (binary) difference and oppositions, to find a language of her own, a lan- 
guage that transcends binaries, that uses a wholly different logic than that which 
we are used to.'" Afeminine language? 
Woman as Lack 
Luce Irigaray is one of the French thinkers who have sharply criticized our 
patriarchal and dualistic use of language and attempted to formulate a pluralis- 
tic language with feminine overtones. Her reasoning is based on a criticism of 
the blindness of psychoanalysis to sexual difference, and the dualistic structure 
that is the basic metaphysical premise of western philosophy. Her aim is to 
escape the polarization that ensnares us in the identities of "man" and "woman," 
to open up the "self' to "the Other." But what does this mean? 
Irigaray returns to the female body in order to formulate an alternative to 
the phallomorphism that dominates our culture. Throughout her work, she 
emphasizes the fact that female sexuality has been conceptualized on the basis of 
masculine parameters-women, for Freud, are "failed men," their genitals are 
seen as a male organ turned back upon itself, a "non-sexy'-while it must, 
instead, be understood on the basis of a wholly different logic, a different alpha- 
bet, a different language. For while man is one, woman is always (at least) two, 
within her own body. Her genitals are formed of "two lips in continuous contact" 
(Irigaray 24). Within herself, she is always already two, but a specific kind of 
two, a two that is not divisible into one(s). She touches herself in and of herself, 
and therefore immediately falls outside of the (typical) distinction between active 
and passive (which, throughout history, has been equaled with the dichotomy 
malelfemale). She touches and is being touched! 
Such a sexual organ, which is never one, in our culture, counts as none. 
And this is how it has become impossible to define, to name, to count. This is 
the mystery of the "dark continent" we call woman. In a culture "claiming to 
count everything, to number everything by units, to inventory everything as 
individualities," woman becomes the negative, the lack, "the reverse of the only 
visible and morphologically designatable organ3'-the penis (Irigaray 26). 
So, when Farrell's patient says: "Words are useless, I want to make you feel 
what I feel," she inscribes herself in this other logic, a logic that gives privilege to 
morphology rather than visibility, to touching rather than seeing, to a kind of sub- 
jectivity which contains the "other" within the "self," which is always already at 
least two, undifferentiated, mixed. She places herself outside the economy of the 
same, in a place where that which is traditionally described as desire for nothing 
(an = non, orexis = desire), ultimately is a desire for everything, for "something 
more and something else besides that on ~ x u a l  organ, for examplethat [we] 
give them, attribute to them" (Irigaray 29). And the whole idea of unity, of truth, of 
propriety of words, as Irigaray writes in her poetic essay "When Our Lips Speak 
Together," comes from men's lack of lips, fiom "their forgetting of lips" (208). 
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Irigaray encourages all women to "come out of their [the men's] lan- 
guage," to move beyond the Phallus, because if we speak "as we have been taught 
to speak," we will "miss each other, fail ourselves" (205). How so? If we "divide 
light from night, we give up the lightness of our mixture, solidify those hetero- 
geneities that make us so consistently whole" (217). A language based on opposi- 
tions ignores, or denies, the possibility of plurality and mixture. And it is through 
this very language, the language we have been taught to speak, that we consti- 
tute ourselves as lacks. Representation cuts us up, divides us, separates us. And 
all we are left with is bodies that do not count, voids awaiting sustenance from 
the other. No wonder the anorexic woman wants to rid herself of this body, a 
body "divided" by language. She erases herself as lack, negates negation so to 
speak. Or, as an anorexic woman, Tricia, puts it: "I remember sort of looking in 
the mirror and actually being surprised that I saw a form in the mirror, and not 
just a nothingness" (Malson 145). 
The anorexic -woman thus protests against a culture where sexual 
difference has been produced through the negation of the body. The Carte- 
sian cogito is placed within a phallocentric economy of the Same, in which 
the sexual specificities of the female body are translated as absence. Or, as 
formulated by Abigail Bray and Claire Colebrook: "the Cartesian cogito 
constitutes a phallocentric, disembodied denial of the fecund and creative 
differences of female corporeality" (Bray and Colebrook 174 f.). 
Mimicry and Mockery 
Anorexia, then, would constitute an attempt to move outside of the language that 
we have at our disposal. The anorexic woman formulates an alternative, a protest. 
But isn't she rather the ultimate "victim" of this language, of our phallocentric 
society? She suffers from it, that much is clear, so how could her skeletal body 
ever be subversive? Alternative? Women have always been seen as nurturers. 
They learn to feed others (physically and emotionally), rather than themselves; 
they develop an "other-oriented" emotional economy (Bordo 174 f.). Their own 
desire is seen as "greedy" and "excessive," they must thus be controlled, tamed. 
And for women, thin is beautiful. Calories are enemies, body fat a sign of weak- 
ness. Thin but nurturing-the feminine ideal. Does this not mean that the 
anorexic woman has adapted to the role society has assigned to her, rather than 
that she protests against it? 
The anorexic body, writes Susan Bordo in her classic Unbearable Weight, 
"may be viewed as a surface on which conventional constructions of femininity 
are exposed starkly to view, through their inscription in extreme or hyperliteral 
form" (171). She brings feminine ideals to their very extreme, caricatures them, 
one could say. And this, according to Irigaray, is exactly the way in which women 
must protest. Irigaray's own search for a feminine language is based on a 
mimetic position, an exaggerated imitation of the masculine discourse, designed 
to criticize and reformulate it. There is, she writes, "in an initial phase, perhaps 
only one 'path,'the one historically assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry" (76). 
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This is the only way to disrupt dichotomization, to "destroy" the discursive 
mechanism as such. What is at stake is to make visible that our language is phal- 
locentric, because if we "return the masculine to its own language," we also 
open the possibility for a "different language" (Irigaray 80). 
"To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place of 
her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it 
[. . .] so as to make 'visible,' by an effect of playful repetition, what was supposed 
to be invisible: the cover-up of a possible operation of the feminine in language," 
Irigaray writes (76). The anorexic woman becomes visible by making herself 
invisible, becomes reduced to body by erasing her own body. And by bringing 
female beauty ideals or the nourishing feminine stereotypes to their extreme, she 
shows how absurd and unnatural these tropes are. She even manages to manipu- 
late and destroy the ultimate symbols of "natural" femininity: She loses her 
breasts, her periods-her nourishing and reproductive abilities. Her body is 
speaking to us of the pathology and violence that constitute the very basis for 
"normal" femininity. And by doing so, it shows that there is no such thing, that 
it, at its very root, is a pantomime. 
Mimicry has thus been the "path" historically assigned to the feminine, 
and it is the only, at least for Irigaray, strategic way "out" of femininity, way "out" 
of femininity, in so far as it is defined as lack, as the negation of masculinity. For 
Lacan, the very fact that woman is rather than has Phallus (that she signifies the 
Phallus by being its Other, its absence, its lack, the dialectical confirmation of its 
identity), that she "appears" to be the Phallus, the lack that embodies and affirms 
it, means that the notion of "masquerade" is essential to the feminine position as 
such (Butler 1999,59). 
This kind of "unconscious" masquerade, woman as masquerade, would be 
an image of the phallic economy's denial of feminine desire. It, again, constitutes 
her as lack. And our anorexic woman, being "a surface on which conventional 
constructions of femininity are exposed starkly to view, through their inscription 
in extreme or hyperliteral form," transforms her very body into a slender and erect 
penis (the anorexic body could be seen as a fetish-a substitute for the loss of the 
phallic mother?), she literally becomes the Phallus, the lack ("I remember [. . .] 
being surprised that I saw a form in the mirror, and not just a nothingness"), and 
thereby makes visible the absurdity of the Lacanian understanding of female 
desire, takes the masquerade to its very extreme, and thereby reveals it as a con- 
struction."' 
To find a language of her own, the anorexic woman, using her body as a 
mouthpiece, must thus utilize the patriarchal structure, infiltrate it and make it her 
own. She has to occupy and reclaim territory lost. Only when she does this is the 
structure revealed, and its dualistic dialectic can be dismantled. For Irigaray, how- 
ever, it is not a question of creating a new type of woman, but rather of liberating 
the actual concept from the dualistic economy of the Logos. The feminine is not 
the Other, but rather, in a literal sense, the unrepresentable. 
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Performance and Parody 
The mimetic method has, in different terms and with different implications, been 
articulated by Judith Butler, for whom gender is aperformative construct of a nor- 
mative culture.vii Butler's reality turns on the idea of language as gesture. By 
behaving as women we become women. Gender is an act, a repeated act. And our 
bodies are effects of signification, created by language. Discourse, or language, 
"is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, inasmuch as this 
signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to find prior to 
any and all signification" (Butler 1993, 30). Language is thus not mimetic or 
representative, signs do not follow bodies as their necessary mirrors, but it is, on 
the contrary, our bodies that "mime" language.viii As we saw, female bodies have, 
through a discourse that constitutes them as lack, become lack. To erase one's 
body, as the anorexic woman does, means to erase an (unwanted) product of phal- 
locentric representation. Again, to negate negation, to get rid of oneself as lack. 
To escape a kind of representation that negates (feminine) corporeality. 
By seeking out subversive physical acts, Butler argues, we can help to 
expose the semiotic system and make visible that gender is a construction without 
natural foundation: "gender parody reveals that the original identity after which 
gender fashions itself is an imitation without an origin" (Butler 1999, 175). For 
Butler, just as for Irigaray, it is thus only "within the practices of repetitive signi- 
fying that a subversion of identity becomes possible" (1999, 185). 
For Butler, drag is the best example of how the sedimentation of identi- 
ty-based thinking can be questioned. Here, it is a man in women's clothing who, 
by imitating and exaggerating feminine attributes, also exposes them as being 
culturally constructed. "In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative 
structure of gender itself-as well as its contingency" (Butler 1999, 175). The 
same, as we have seen, applies to the anorexic woman who, by exaggerating the 
restrictive beauty ideals to which modern women are expected to conform, 
reveals them as absurd and culturally constructed. Em Farrell, moreover, con- 
firms that in her clinical experience "many bulimics and anorexics attempt to 
postpone indefinitely the realization of which sex they belong to, as though it 
was a decision that could be made by choice alone. They attempt to identify 
with being both male and female and so imagine they can provide everything or 
themselves" (26). 
So, while Butler's analysis is based on the Foucauldian notion of discourse 
as that which produces us as subjects, she is more optimistic than him about the 
possibility of, maybe not escaping discourse but at least formulating a subversive 
protest against it, by making it visible.lx The fact that we are constructed by dis- 
course is actually, for Butler, the very condition for the possibility of agency: 
"Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the 
very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible" 
(1999, 187). 
The conceptualization of identity as an effect, as something produced or 
generated, opens up possibilities of agency. The anorexic woman, just like all 
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women (and men!), is an effect of phallocratic culture, a "victim" of it, but she uti- 
lizes the very fact that the "natural" femininity that she is expected to adapt to is 
nothing but a construction, nothing but a copy of a copy, and by multiplying it as 
copy, by miming it and exaggerating it, by bringing it to the brink of death, she 
reveals it, unmasks it, and, therefore, potentially undermines it. 
So, while some would argue that her self-starvation is a corporeal response 
to the incorporation of, and living out of, phallocentric representations, I would 
argue, in line with Irigaray's and Butler's notions of mimicry or parody, that she 
utilizes it to reveal it as a construction and that she, literally, erases and rids her- 
self of the very product of representation-her own body. And by doing so, she 
draws attention not only to her body as a construct, but also to (feminine) corpo- 
reality as such, to that which has been repressed (or ignored) by discourse.* 
Conclusion: Subversion or Failure? 
But is anorexia really parodic and playful? Is there anything amusing about these 
starving women? Are they not rather tragic? It might be more appropriate, here, to 
talk ofpastiche than of parody. Pastiche, according to Frederic Jameson, "is blank 
parody, parody that has lost its humor" (Butler 1999, 176). Mimicry without 
laughter. And, furthermore (as we have seen), pastiche, as opposed to dis- 
putes and puts into question the very possibility of an "original" or, as in the case 
of gender, "reveals the 'original' as a failed effort to 'copy' a phantasmatic ideal 
that cannot be copied without failure" (Butler 1999, 201, no. 56). 
Just as the "original" as such is a failure (since it turns out to be nothing 
but a copy), the imitation of it, in terms of potentially being a subversive act, also 
always risks failure. Not every parodic repetition is effectively disruptive, Butler 
reminds us. Some "rather become domesticated and recirculated as instruments of 
cultural hegemony" (Butler 1999, 177). Anorexia is clearly a failed protest. As 
Bordo points out, it "isolates" and "weakens" its sufferers, and it is always a 
protest that risks collapsing into its opposite, to proclaim "the utter capitulation of 
the subjects to the contracted female world" (176). It is a constant balancing act 
and, as many have pointed out before me, even if anorexia is understood as 
protest, it is most commonly a protest that not even its sufferers are aware of. An 
unconscious protest. 
Nevertheless, by moving within and alongside the patriarchal structure 
that defined (the anorexic) woman from the start, she mimes it, and simultane- 
ously creates a criticism of it. Or, as formulated by Jan Jagodzinski: "By 'follow- 
ing' the rules of patriarchy to the 'letter' [. . .] she manipulates them" (3 1). She 
reveals the order and oppression of the discourse and becomes a spokesperson for 
the narrowly defined template to which we as women are expected to conform. 
The anorexic body demonstrates that the traditional or "natural" feminine role is 
a social and cultural construct and, moreover, one that clearly makes 
women suffer. 
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Notes 
l I want to emphasize that this reading is not an attempt to romanticize eating dis- 
orders or to promote them as a constructive and effective protest. I am very aware 
that anorexic women inflict extreme pain, not only upon themselves but also on 
people around them and people who c&e for them.   he^ have taken on a very dan- 
gerous task, oftentimes a deadly one, and their pain and suffering must not be 
underestimated. 
ii In "The Body and the Reproduction of Femininity: A Feminist Appropriation of 
Foucault," Susan Bordo places agoraphobia in the same category of illnesses. 
Hysteria, agoraphobia and anorexia, she claims, are all extensions or extremes of 
cultural sex role stereotypes for women in different times (the Victorian era, the 
1950s and our contemporary epoch). On the epidemic of hysteria (and neurasthe- 
nia)-specifically as symptoms of stereotypical femininity, see Elaine 
Showalter's The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830- 
1980. Showalter points out that the term hysterical itself became almost inter- 
changeable with the term feminine in the literatwe of the period (129). H y s t e r i a ,  
too, has been interpreted by feminists as a protest against patriarchy and phallogocen- 
trism. H&ne Cixous, for example, speaks of "those wonderful hysterics, who sub- 
jected Freud to so many voluptuous moments too shameful to mention, bombarding 
his mosaic statutehaw of Moses with their carnal, passionate body-words, haunting 
him with their inaudible thundering denunciations." For Cixous, Dora, who so 
frustrated Freud, is "the core example of the protesting force in women" (Cixous, The 
Newly Born Woman. Quoted from Bordo 175). 
iii Lane, in "Anorexia, Masochism, Self-Mutilation, and Autoerotism: The Spider 
Mother," summarizes psychoanalytic views on anorexia, and claims that the 
symptom "helps the girl to avoid dealing with both sexuality and separation, as 
the symptoms encourage further enmeshment and attachment to and by the 
mother." And further: "The symptoms are adaptive as they protect the girl from 
the demands of maturity for which she is ill prepared" (113). 
'V I am hereby not simply rejecting the traditional psychoanalytic understanding 
of anorexia as a fear of separation, but I would argue that the psychologistic model 
is insufficient for a full understanding of eating disorders, and that it has to be 
combined with a structural understanding of the symptoms, taking the question of 
gender and language into account. This being said, however, I think thatevery case 
of anorexia has to be seen in its very uniqueness, and that these symptoms are far 
too complex and complicated to be squeezed into some universal conceptualization. 
I am simply trying to add one interpretation, in the hope of fhther balancing our 
understanding of this epidemic. 
V This mixture of activity and passivity is one of the ultimate characteristics of the 
anorexic woman, who, through her self-destructive behavior, is sadistic and 
masochistic at once. She takes on an intermediate position between the typical 
pair of opposites. This could be seen as a kind of "negative" or "destructive" ver- 
sion of autoerotism, as described by Freud in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." 
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Freud, in this text, points out how both scopophilia and exhibitionism begin with 
a yet earlier drive, namely that in which one looks at an object that is part of one's 
own body. One looks and is being looked at simultaneously (Freud 130). Also 
compare Merleau-Ponty's notion of the chiasm, which is based on the idea of 
simultaneously touching and being touched. 
The most famous conceptualization of femininity as masquerade is Joan 
Riviere's 1929 essay "Womanliness as Masquerade." 
Austin was the first to conceptualize the notion of the performative. Performa- 
tive utterances, as opposed to statements (or declarative utterances), are neither 
true nor false. Statements like "I apologize," "I advise you to do it," "I promise 
you that I will be there," or "I hereby name this ship Liberte'," all perform an 
action. To say "I promise" is the very act of making a promise, whether you keep 
that promise or not. It is a speech-act, a performative. 
This means, in line with Foucault's emphasis on discourse as a constant prac- 
tice, that identity is the result of practices, that it is "doing" rather than "being." 
Consequently, as Bray and Colebrook have pointed out, anorexia, too, is a series of 
practices and comportments; "there are no anorexics, only activities of dietetics, 
measuring, regulation and calculation" (Bray and Colebrook 62). 
lX Foucault, throughout his work, emphasized the productive character of dis- 
course (and of power). He showed, maybe most clearly in the first volume of his 
History of Sexuality, that it is the very speech that is introduced to "liberate" us 
(confession, psychoanalysis) that actually produces us as subjects. His under- 
standing of power and discourse has been criticized for paralyzing the subject and 
making (political) agency impossible. The final Foucault, though, in volume two 
and three of The History of Sexuality, introduces what he calls "technologies of 
the self' as a possible way towards agency and freedom. 
X One could ask, here, whether it makes sense to postulate some kind of "true" 
femininity, which then would have been repressed/ignored/excluded from dis- 
course, if we, at the same time, see femininity and masculinity as discursive 
constructs. Irigaray and Butler have often been situated at two different sides 
of the traditional division between essentialism and constructivism, and Butler, 
in Gender Trouble, criticizes Irigaray exactly for being essentialist. A full dis- 
cussion about this would require much more space than I have here, and I will 
not even attempt to "solve" the problem. I would, however, at least imply that I 
think Irigaray, exactly through her notion of mimesis, has accomplished the chal- 
lenging task of reconciling the traditional feminist split, and that her account may 
seem more essentialist than it actually is. Her biological essentialism could be 
seen as a rhetorical strategy. What Irigaray tries to do, and this is where the 
inside/outside distinction becomes problematic and invalid, is to situate the femi- 
nine as the unspeakable condition of figuration, that which can never be figured 
but whose exclusion from that propriety is its enabling condition. When Irigaray 
mimes the language of philosophy or psychoanalysis, she takes on a language 
that effectively cannot belong to her, only to call into question the exclusionary 
rules of proprietariness that govern the use of discourse. This is a point 
actually made by Judith Butler, when she re-reads Irigaray after having 
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published Gender Trouble, and problematizes her own critical reading of her. In 
Bodies That Mattel; Butler compares Irigaray's gesture with that of Derrida who, 
in his consideration of the formlmatter distinction (in Positions) suggests that 
"matter must be redoubled, at once as a pole within a binary opposition, and as 
that which exceeds that binary coupling, as a figure for its nonsystematizability." 
So, when Irigaray, in Marine Lovel; writes that "woman neither is nor has 
essence," she basically means that the phallic economy, which claims to include 
the feminine as the subordinate term in a binary opposition of masculinelfemi- 
nine, actually rather excludes the feminine, that is, produces it as that which must 
be excluded from the phallic economy, in order for it to operate at all. For both 
Derrida and Irigaray, Butler argues, it seems like "what is excluded from this bina- 
ry is also produced by it in the mode of exclusion and has no separable or fully 
independent existence as an absolute outside." The case is then rather that it 
"emerges within the system as incoherence, disruption, a threat to its own 
systematicity" (Butler 1993,37 ff.). It is thus not a matter of "true" femininity, but 
nevertheless of a kind of "constitutive outside," although produced by (and from 
within) discourse. 
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